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The smaller sophisticated nations have to decide where
to procure their weapons systems. Though these smaller
countries are probably capable o-f designing and manu-factur
—
ing their own systems, this is not necessarily the most
economically e-f-ficient use o-f their resources. This paper
canvasses some o-f the issues involved in a make or buy
decision. It then suggests a cost/benefit analysis as one
way o-f applying a value to the pros and cons o-f the alterna-
tives o-f make; buy; or varying shades o-f a mixture o-f the
two. It -further suggests that the whole o-f li-fe costs,
rather than the acquisition costs, should be the basis -for
the decision process and then that the alternative with the
highest net present value should be the one selected.
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Australia is one o-f a number o-f smaller nations which
possesses a well-established, sophisticated industrial base.
In theory, it has su-f-ficient resources to undertake the
necessary research, development and production required to
satisfy its own de-fence needs. History shows, however, that
Australia has preferred to purchase a substantial proportion
of its requirements overseas. These purchases have been
from the larger industrialised Western nations, usually in
the -face o-f considerable opposition from its own industrial
and trade union sources.
All things being equal, it would seem that a government
should prefer to obtain its defence equipment from its
domestic infrastructure. There must be compelling reasons
for it to do otherwise. Primary reasons revolve around such
issues as dependability, higher value uses for the required
resources, comparative advantage and acceptable delivery
t i mes
.
The Australian Government has recognised that it faces
difficult decisions in this area during the procurement of
major defence items such as weapons systems. On June 3rd,
1984, it issued a "Defence Policy for Australian Industry".
CRef.lJ The thrust of this policy is that Australia would
like to have a strong defence industry but that there Are
costs to such an approach. In general, de-fence equipment
manuf actured in Australia costs more, in dollar terms, than
equivalent equipment procured overseas. It is necessary to
identi-fy the economic e-f-fects of possible courses o-f action
be-fore deciding where to have equipment manufactured. The
Government stated in its "De-fence Policy -for Australian
Industry" that where the total cost o-f procuring equipment
in Australia is higher than the total cost o-f buying it
elsewhere, then the equipment should not be purchased in
Australia unless there are strategic reasons for pursuing a
domestic procurement.
Clearly, the best possible estimation of the likely
total costs and total benefits of alternative courses of
action is germane to the final decision. The Government
recognised this when it said in its statement:
"There is a need for (the Departments of) Defence and
Defence Support to employ more formal processes that
identify the benefits and penalties of local industrial
capabilities and of Australian participation in specific
equipment programs to allow assessments to be made against
alternative support options and competing force structure
and infrastructure needs, to the maximum extent possible -
(the Department of) Defence is to provide policy guidance
which is to include the specification of important local
capabilities and acceptable cost premiums for their reten-
tion and development." CRef.13
This paper will explore one approach to deciding whether
to make at home or to buy from another country. The metho-
dology will be to draw a decision tree in order to raise the
issues that need to be addressed before proceeding from one
decision node to the next. Each issue raised will be
addressed in a general manner and the reader will be direc-
ted to -further, more detailed discussion should he need it.
It is assumed that the Project Director or Program
Manager will be charged with the responsibility for marshal-
ling the necessary arguments and in-formation to allow him to
dra-ft the required submissions -for consideration and even-
tual approval by higher authority. This paper is directed
at him in the belie-f that he is unlikely to be an expert on
many o-f the issues raised and will consult with specialists
as necessary. It is intended primarily as a tool to assist
the project manager in pursuing a structured approach to
establishing the best line o-f action -for his project. All
projects are different and will almost certainly require
different levels of emphasis on particular points. The
answers to many of the questions raised will be obvious,
other questions may well be difficult, if not impossible, to
answer
.
The decision tree approach is meant to assist in identi-
fying the particular issues involved and the alternative
approaches which may be taken. The next stage is to quant-
ify, as best as possible, the costs and benefits of each
alternative. The net present value of each alternative
approach should then be calculated in order to identify the
one which results in the least cost to the taxpayer.
While the discussion is addressed to the Australian
situation in particular, it should have general application
10
•for other nations and even -for large companies which are
faced with a 'make or buy' decision.
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II. THE DECISION TREE
A. CONVENTION USED
The three pages which -follow depict one decision tree.
The symbols used are those recognised internationally -for
-flow chart logic diagrams. In the United States, they are
recognised by the American National Standards Institute
(ANSI) under code Y32 14.
The only exception to this is the letter which is to be
-found alongside each decision node. The purpose o-f this
letter is to direct the reader's attention to the particular
section o-f Chapter III where a list o-f issues that might be
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III. ISSUES INVOLVED
This chapter is a listing of issues that might be
addressed at each of the decision nodes identified in the
previous chapter.
A. IS CAPACITY AVAILABLE IN-COUNTRY?
1. Are all the required equipment and -Facilities avail-
able?
2. Are there sufficient people with the needed skills
available in the right places to complete the project?
3. Is the required technology available? (Comment — this
is probably not an issue if 1 & 2 above are positive).
B. DO WE WANT TO USE THE CAPACITY FOR THIS PROJECT?
1. Is the capacity already being used for something else?
2. Is there an identified higher value use for the capac-
ity?
3. What will happen to the capacity if we do not use it?
4. What is the cost of using our capacity against the cost
of having the weapons system produced overseas?
5. What is the social cost of not using our capacity?
6. Even if we do not wish to procure the whole weapons
system in-country, is there some part of the process that
we wish to undertake using existing facilities and skills?
7. Can those parts of the project which we wish to under-
take in—country be successfully interfaced with those
parts undertaken elsewhere?
S. Are prospective overseas suppliers likely to allow
parts of the system procurement to be undertaken outside
their direct control?
16
C. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CAPACITY
1. Do we wish to develop all or part o-f the weapons system
in—country and then have it completed elsewhere?
2. Why do we wish to conduct R & D?
a. Because we have the capability? (See A & B above).
b. Because we want the capability? (See F below).
D. MANUFACTURING CAPACITY
1. Do we wish to manu-facture to an overseas design?
2. Do we wish to manufacture the whole o-f the weapons
system or just parts o-f it?
3. Why do we wish to conduct manu-f acturing?
a. Because we have the capability? (See A & B above).
b. Because we want the capability? (See E below).
E. DO WE WANT THE CAPACITY?
1. What will it cost to obtain the technology or facil-
ities to undertake the project?
2. Is this a worthwhile investment?
a. Is there likely to be a continuing requirement -for
the capacity after this project is completed?
b. Are the technologies acquired likely to have other
appl i cations?
3. Can we afford the investment?
4. Are the sought-after technologies and facilities re-
quired to operate and maintain the weapons system in
service? (See G below).
F. DO WE WISH TO MAINTAIN THE SYSTEM IN-COUNTRY?
1. Do we have the necessary technologies and facilities to
undertake maintenance?
2. To what level can we be self-sufficient?
3. Is this a su-f f i ci entl y high level to operate the
system?
4. What is the likelihood o-f obtaining the required level
o-f maintenance elsewhere i f needed?
5. What are the costs o-f conducting maintenance elsewhere?
6. Is it possible to operate the system at maximum effect-
iveness without being able to maintain it?
7. Do we wish to improve and adapt the performance o-f the
system over time? What is the required level o-f mainten-
ance skills to be able to do this?
G. WHAT LEVEL OF SELF-MAINTENANCE DO WE REQUIRE?
1. What is the highest standard of performance required of
the system likely to be?
2. What level of maintenance capacity is required to meet
this standard?
3. Do we require to have this maintenance capacity avail-
able in—country or can we rely on timely availability
elsewhere whenever it is needed?
4. Does the required level of maintenance dictate an R & D
and/or manufacturing capacity?
5. Is it economical to stockpile all required spare parts?
H. IS SOME MANUFACTURING OF PRIME EQUIPMENT DESIRABLE?
1. Are manufacturing skills necessary in order to perform
the required levels of maintenance?
2. What skills?
3. Is it necessary to have these capabilities at whatever
cost?
4. Is it desirable to minimise the money being spent
overseas on the project?
IS
5. Can we manufacture some components o-f the weapons
system as cheaply as, or cheaper than, the prime manu-f ac-
turer?
6. Can we sell components as a co-producer?
I. WHAT RESOURCES ARE NEEDED FOR THE REQUIRED MAINTENANCE
LEVEL?
1. Will already planned manufacturing -Facilities provide
all these resources?
2. What other suitable resources Are already in—country?
3. Will these resources be available when required?










The -first questions with regard to a 'make or buy'
decision concern capacity. I-F the acquiring country does
not have, and does not want to invest in, the required
capacity, then the question becomes merely one o-F where best
to buy the proposed system overseas.
Capacity is here de-fined as the total ability to bring
into operational service a weapons system or pre-determined
parts of that system. It includes the necessary raw mater-
ials, capital equipment, technology and labour (human
resources). These items need not necessarily be in-piace at
the time that the 'make or buy' decision is made, however
there has to be a credible plan -for acquiring the necessary
inputs so that they are available as needed. When looked at
-from this standpoint, it is di-f-ficult to envisage under what
circumstances economically advanced countries such as Aust-
ralia would lack the capacity to develop, manufacture and
bring into service any weapons system as, in an absolute
sense, the -financial means are available to purchase the
necessary resources. There ar& certain areas where a coun-
try may lack the will to involve itsel-f in a particular
technology. A good example o-f this is provided by those
nations that are signatories to nuclear non—prol i-f eration
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pacts. This latter point is generally a non-issue, however,
as countries are unlikely to wish to acquire weapons systems
that use technologies to which they are unwilling to
subscribe.
The key to any reasoned analysis o-f the make or buy
decision may be a cost/benefit analysis o-f using capacity to
produce all or part o-f the desired weapons system against
acquiring the system by some other means, -for example out-
right purchase or leasing. This holds true whether a coun-
try is under constant threat, such as Israel, or one which
cannot identi-fy any speci-fic threat, such as New Zealand.
The difference between the two is that the -former country
almost certainly places a much higher value on acquiring, in
a short time—frame, an operational system which has guaran-
teed maintainability. It is there-fore more prepared to
forgo other uses for its capacity.
The cost /benefit analysis is very complex as it involves
national interests and looks many years into the future. It
is a matter of national strategic planning and involves such
intangibles as 'the national interest', foreign policy' and
'system integrity'. A reasonable insight can be gained,
however, if the question of 'make or buy' is broken down in-
to its component parts and then those parts which have quan-
tifiable costs and benefits are identified and analysed.
The unquanti f i abl e issues need to be identified and then
listed. Politicians are elected and paid to make decisions
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on such matters. It is the duty o-f the service materiel
command to attempt to quantity only those issues to which a
monetary value can be attached and to leave to the politi-
cians those unquanti-f i able issues which can be loosely des-
cribed as policy.
The issues raised in Chapter III are now discussed in
more detail. The object is to identity the issues and dis-
cuss them in general terms. No etfort is made to quantity
costs and benefits as this can only be done on a case by
case basis.
B. IS CAPACITY AVAILABLE IN-COUNTRY?
1 . Availability of Equipments and Facilities
The purchase of a major weapons system requires a
comprehensive mix of capital equipment and facilities.
These capital investments are normally part of the domestic
economy, though some final assembly and testing facilities,
such as a navy—owned dockyard or a missile test-range, may
have only military applications. The general parameters of
the desired weapons system are likely to be known early in
the process. It should be a fairly straightforward task to
prepare an inventory of the sorts of facilities and cap-
abilities required and then compare this against what is
available now and what is planned to be added or deleted in
the time-span of interest. It is especially important to
identify those features of a weapons system that are likely
to be di-f-f icul t to satisfy, -For example -facilities -for
bending, rolling and welding submarine pressure hulls; con-
struction material -for aircra-ft skins; and casting and
machining o-f artillery barrels. These are applications
which are usually not required in the domestic economy and
may not be available when required. The cost o-f providing
such -facilities must be weighed against the likely outputs
of these -facilities over their designed useful lives. The
designed life of any major plant is likely to far exceed the
time span of the envisaged weapons system acquisition pro-
ject. Thus any likely future uses for the plant need to be
identified and taken into account when calculating the net
cost of acquiring any particular capacity. A method of
calculating the net cost will be discussed in Chapter VI.
2. Human Resources
As with capital investment, human investment lends
itself to being inventoried. It is generally held that
labour is more mobile than capital investment, however it is
important to identify the labour that is needed to operate
the equipment and facilities envisaged. Is it available in
the needed quantities, with the right skills, at the right
location? The cost of moving labour is high, and getting
higher, as society becomes more sophisticated. Frequently,
labour is unwilling to move because it is locked into a
particular location. This is particularly true of skilled,
semi—skilled and unskilled labour. There may be two or
three incomes in the -Family unit to support the cost o-F the
home; or the -family may well be living in government subsi-
dised or controlled rental accomodation; or children may be
attending local colleges. From the workers' point o-f view,
they must see themselves as being better o-f-f a-fter a reloca-
tion than they are at present. There must be reasonable
certainty as to continuity of employment at the new location
-for the worker to adopt this happy point o-f view. Continui-
ty o-f employment requires the identification o-f follow—up
projects.
Even though the costs of relocating labour are high,
the alternative of retraining labour is equally costly and
something which the nations of the western World are notor-
iously poor at. A properly financed comprehensive worker
training programme is a rarity in the public domain and is
usually undertaken in the private sector at the middle to
higher management levels rather than at the skilled worker
level. Australia has employed a policy of importing skilled
labour but this source now has less significance than it had
in the past. The costs of retraining people include not
only the direct training costs but also the costs of keeping
the trainee and his dependents in the style to which they
have become accustomed. An often overlooked cost is that of
the loss of productivity of the trainee in his old occupa-
tion while he is being trained for the new one. The benefit
is that, hopefully, a person's productivity will be
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signif icantly enhanced after his course of training. A
cost /benefit analysis in this area is difficult as many
variables are involved and little useful research has been
publ i shed.
C. DO WE WANT TO USE THE CAPACITY FOR THIS PROJECT?
1 . Competition for Available Capacity
Having established that there is an in-country capa-
city, the next step is to investigate the availability of
that capacity for the project under consideration. The
program manager needs to identify, in general terms, those
facilities and skills for which he is likely to find
difficulty in gaining the necessary allocation. Projected
difficulties may be due to either a limited amount of the
required resources being in existence or to high usage rates
for the known resources. In either case, there is a situa-
tion of scarcity and a need for the country to allocate the
available resources to the highest value uses. For example,
a country might have two manufacturers of electric genera-
tors and motors. It may have projected requirements for
generating sets for use in exploiting underdeveloped areas,
generators and motors for new diesel electric locomotives
and motors to drive pumps for an irrigation scheme. The
project manager needs to understand the effect that adding a
requirement for similar equipment for a new class of
conventionally powered submarines might have and what comp-
etition there is likely to be -for the resources he requires.
The simplest way o-f conducting such an investigation
is to call -for bids to undertake the work and then allow
free market -forces to establish the true cost o-f employing
those resources. This avenue is unlikely to be available,
however, as such approaches Are generally considered to be
unethical and, in any case, take too long to complete.
The alternative of estimating the costs and the most
e-f-ficient uses o-f the available resources by using the
economist's tools o-f welfare economics and general equilib-
rium analysis is not yet developed to the point where it is
practical -for this purpose.
There-fore the project manager should resort to a
cost/bene-f i t analysis o-f his proposed actions. As both
costs and bene-fits accrue to the taxpayer it is important
that the task is carried out to the best o-f the program
manager's ability, taking account o-f his limited resources
and information. He should be as accurate and objective as
possible. Cost/bene-f it analysis is discussed -further in
Chapter VI.
2. Idle Capacity
At the other end o-f the spectrum is the identifica-
tion o-f capacity which is not being utilised and for which
there are no planned competing uses. This time the reverse
question has to be asked. What is the cost of not using
available domestic resources? Idle capital equipment depre-
ciates in value and also requires maintenance to keep it
operable. Capital investment in idle plant and machinery
could have been employed to better effect elsewhere- The
cost o-f not using available plant and machinery can be
estimated using readily available, usually government-
established, accounting factors. It has been estimated that
the cost o-F idle capacity in the defence sector of the US
aircraft industry alone is as high as $500 million per annum
ERef . 3: p . 1773 . The cost of unemployed manpower can be partly
calculated as the sum of the direct costs of unemployment
and other welfare benefits and the loss of productivity of
that manpower. Much more difficult to estimate is the toll
on the individuals concerned. A person who does not use
acquired skills tends to lose them, though the rate of loss
is generally unquantif i able. An estimate can be made, how-
ever, by calculating the cost of an individual 's training
and then estimating the rate of loss of skills learned.
In the extreme, the non—uti 1 isation of capacity will
lead to its disappearance. An example of this was the loss
of ability to design and manufacture saturated steam propul-
sion systems prior to the introduction of nuclear sub-
marines. Should such a loss seem a possibility, then it is
necessary to seek any other potential uses for that capaci-
ty. If it is desirable to retain idle capacity because of
other uses, then the true costs of keeping that capacity
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available should be adjusted to allow -for other potential
users to share in that cost. Where it can be established
that a particular capacity must be maintained for some other
use, then the cost allocation to the defence project under
consideration -for maintaining it should be zero.
Any identified excess capacity costs for undertaking
the required work need to be taken into consideration when
comparing domestic and quoted overseas prices.
3. Use of Domestic Capacity for Partial Completion of
the Acquisition
Where it is agreed that the whole of a weapons
acquisition project should not be undertaken in-country, it
may well be attractive to complete parts of it overseas and
parts at home. Indeed, for the smaller developed countries,
this is the most likely scenario. Even the most sophisti-
cated weapons systems use some technologies which have been
established for considerable periods of time and which will
have found their way into the industry bases of a number of
countries. In such areas, the smaller countries may well be
competitive with the major weapons supplier countries. An
assembled and tested major weapons system is the product of
the work of many sub-contractors. The British Polaris
weapons system, for instance, utilised over 20,000 sub-
contractors.
The management of the integration and construction
of a warship, aircraft or tank is a major undertaking in
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itself. To introduce component parts made in di-f-ferent
countries adds to that task, and consequently to its costs,
by increasing the project's complexity. Components made in
different countries would, if not controlled, be produced to
different standards and tolerances. The controlling of
these standards leads to costs in the areai of project man-
agement. These costs must be added to the quoted price of
the domestically produced component parts to give the real
cost of local manufacturing involvement, by using techniques
which have been previously described. Increased manufactu-
ring costs Are generated by applying unusual standards to a
particular manufacturer's work—methods and practices to
ensure that his manufactured parts interface with the rest
of the system. Generally, the domestic producer is acting
as a sub—contractor to an overseas prime—contractor and so
the domestic operation bears the cost of meeting these
standards.
A major reason for seeking local component manufac-
ture is to ensure that the capacity is available in-country
to maintain the weapons system during its operational life.
This aspect will be addressed in some detail in Chapter V-
4. Research, Development and System Design
The idea of using one's own scientists and designers
to work on national weapons systems is intuitively appealing
to the leaders of most developed nations, for reasons of
national prestige. The dollar costs of R & D ^re high. For
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instance Pratt and Whitney invested in excess of $1 billion
to develop its PW 2037 turbine CRef.2:p 83. The cost to the
US Department o-F Defense of developing the MK 48 torpedo is
estimated to be in excess o-f $500 million CRef.3:pp 34 &
102D. US Department o-F Defense experience has shown that
less than twenty per cent of R & D expenditure is used on
research and advanced development. At least sixty per cent
o-f such funds is spent on full-scale development. CRef.3:p
9713 The smaller nations have to look at these very high
initial costs and consider the numbers of systems over which
the costs can be amortised. Additional opportunities where
the R & D might be applied should be considered, including
the likelihood of selling the technology developed to other
potential users, either by way of manufactured equipments or
by license fees. The project manager can have only general
ideas in this area and should consult with trade and indus-
try development professionals in order to target likely
appl i cations.
The true costs of research and development for indi-
vidual systems are the estimated costs incurred, adjusted
for the share which might be borne by other likely users of
the new technology. Before embarking on a research and
development program, it is wise to search the world techno-
logical base to identify any other developers of the re-
quired technology or acceptable substitutes for it. The
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cost of purchasing the technology should be compared with
the true cost of developing it domestically.
Economies o-f scale dictate that the larger nations,
particularly the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. , undertake the
majority o-f research and development work as these countries
are able to spread the costs over larger numbers o-f deployed
systems. Because o-f the much larger economic bases -from
which they are operating, the results o-f -failure o-f any one
endeavour are much less severe than they would be in a
smaller country.
The national interest' plays a significant part in
R&D decisions and may well be the deciding -factor. This
may arise either because a particularly coveted technology
is not available or because it is deemed essential to have
total national control of it. Good examples of decisions in
this area are provided by those economically disadvantaged
countries such as India and Pakistan that see a need to
possess a nuclear capability. South Africa has developed a
number of its own weapons because it is denied access to
recognised markets. Australia has developed systems in the
Anti— Submarine Warfare field to suit its own particular
needs as the thrust of NATO ASW development has been to
produce systems, for use in the colder waters of the nor-
thern hemisphere, which are not ideally suited to Austra-
lia's warmer conditions.
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The project manager should strive to obtain the
required research and development at the lowest real cost,
however it is possible that the 'national interest will
prevail on occasion. In this case it is a worthwhile exer-
cise to estimate the cost o-f pursuing the latter goal to
assist the politicians in their decision—making.
5. Production
Many o-f the arguments that apply to the use o-f R & D
capacity for defence projects are relevant to the use o-f
production capacity. It is generally easier to identify
other uses for investment in production capabilities than it
is for investment in R & D.
Economies of scale are particularly relevant. As
the quantity produced increases, the true cost of producing
each item should get closer to the variable costs of pro-
ducing it (the marginal cost of production). The quantity
produced per time—period is also important as this impacts
directly on the efficiency of plant size. If it is en-
visaged that existing production facilities are to be used,
then the closer the quantity produced per time period is to
the capacity of the plant, the more economically efficient
the operation becomes. If new plant is to be utilised, then
the size of the plant should match the envisaged output rate
in order to achieve maximum economic efficiency. It is more
efficient to produce three ships per year in a yard designed
to produce that number o-F ships per year than it is at any
other rate.
It is a generally accepted principle that the larger
the plant, the lower the unit cost of production, providing
that the plant is properly utilised. This should favour the
larger country as it has a larger likely market. In theory,
dis-economies of scale can occur. These rarely manifest
themselves, however, because the larger a firm is, the more
power it is able to exert over its resource suppliers in
dictating the price of its inputs. Larger scale production
may lead to learning curve advantages. Where a particular
process is repeated, it should take less time to complete it
each time it is done. The marginal cost of production
should therefore decrease as production numbers increase.
Buff a provides a good explanation of this process and shows
simple methods by which the rate of reduction of costs can
be estimated when they are subject to learning effects
CRef.43. Learning effects reguire that human effort is
involved in the process and that there is exact repetition.
Any change in the process will negate some or all of the
learning effect.
An avenue available to smaller countries is to spe-
cialise in the production of certain component parts of wea-
pons systems. Countries should specialise in those products
for which they have a comparative advantage. CRef . 5: p. 233
That is, a country should manufacture those goods which it
does relatively most e-f-f ici ently
.
Where a weapon system is being acguired in part from
overseas, the project manager should, in attempting to mini-
mise the true cost of his project, consider a position of
co-production where his country is supplying components used
in the manufacture of all units of the weapons system and
not just in those units being supplied to his country. This
is generally well recognised and is the basis of many off-
set production agreements.
Off -set production arrangements may also be based on
in—country production of an overseas design. In many cases,
this approaches an assembly and test operation with the
majority of components being imported. The supplying coun-
try provides much of the technology and the coordinative
management expertise. The advantage to the recipient coun-
try is that it does not involve itself in the high unit—cost
R&D previously discussed but retains a considerable prop-
ortion of the project price in the domestic economy by
conducting the comparatively 1 abour—intensive tasks of ass-
embly, testing and 'set to work'. As an added bonus, the
acquiring country is generally able to use its own construc-
tion materials such as steel, wiring and pipework. This
form of approach is likely to lead to the lowest real cost
of acquiring weapons systems, as the recipient country is
able to selectively buy, rather than produce, those items
34
and services which would present it with high real costs
should it attempt to manufacture those items using its own
resources. For instance, Australia is currently preparing
itself to assemble F/A-18A aircraft. A composite fabrica-
tion plant has been commissioned which allows the airframe
to be 'glued' together rather than being riveted. This
process, the R ?« D costs of which were paid for by the US,
will significantly reduce the cost of airframe production.
6. The Worth of Acquiring New Capacity
Related to purchasing high real cost items and serv-
ices overseas is the question of whether a country needs the
capacity at all. Should it be desired to acquire the abili-
ty to produce to a particular technology, it is necessary to
consider the continued uses for that capability after the
current project is completed. This may well apply to the
F18 example just cited. If no other uses can be identified,
then the entire costs of the capacity acquired should be set
against the project. Any identified alternative uses will
reduce that cost. The assessed cost of capacity acquisition
should be compared with the likely off-the-shelf' cost of
purchasing the completed goods or services overseas.
An often stated, but frequently misguided, reason
for acquiring and maintaining reserve capacity is for indu-
strial mobilisation. Discussion of the topic tends not to
link the facilities sought with the scenario under which
they will be used. For instance, it would seem unsound to
consider maintaining a reserve ship-building capacity where
it takes four years to build a ship in a scenario which sees
the maximum length o-f a credible con-flict as being eighteen
months.
Reserve capacity tends to become dated quickly.
Minimal maintenance is carried out and the ability to ex-
ploit some technologies becomes limited. A good example o-f
this is the rapid increase in the use of computer aided
design and computer aided manu-facture (CAD/CAM). The human
skills required -For CAD/CAM are very dif-ferent -from those
that were in general use only -five or ten years ago -for
manual dra-fting and machining. It is usually not possible
to manu-facture manually from drawings produced by and tor
CAD/CAM systems. Tolerances &re o-f an order so di-f-ferent
that mere man cannot per -form to the required standards. In
any case, the skills o-f the old toolsetter and machine
operator are disappearing as few new personnel are being
trained in these skills and older personnel retire. Such
reserve physical capacity soon becomes worthless. Another
example is provided by the US Army which has whole munitions
factories in reserve. The plants ar& maintained, but there
are no credible plans for staffing them with suitably skil-
led labour. CRef . 3: p. 1693 Before a decision is made to
acquire a particular capacity, its likely useful life should
be considered and costed accordingly.
V. MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS
A. INTRODUCTION
One o-f the issues raised in the previous chapter was the
acquiring nation's desire to be able to maintain its weapons
systems using its own resources.
The need to be able to operate and maintain all owned
weapons systems without outside assistance is present in the
strategic thinking o-f all the more technologically advanced
nations, however there is some variation in the degree o-f
their perceived need- The NATO countries, -for example, have
established a comprehensive mutual support and maintenance
network as manifested by the Rationalisation, Standardisa-
tion, and Interoperability (NATO RSI) concept. Australia
has taken a somewhat stronger stance on sel-f-rel i ance as
exempli -fied in a recent statement from Minister o-f De-fence
Scholes:
"Labor's de-fence policy is in essence to develop a more
sel-f —rel i ant strategic posture based on the principle o-f
developing independent national de-fence capabilities to
deter conventional attacks on Australian territory."
CRe-f .73
The desire -for independence and self-reliance in the
operation and maintenance o-f a nation's de-fence -force is
driven by the -fear that -foreign sources might be closed o-f-f
when most needed. Such a situation might be caused by a
deterioration in the relationship between supplier and buyer
nations, or by the intervention o-f a third party to stop
estabished flows, or even by the supplier country deciding
that it needs to keep its resources -for its own use.
A plan to purchase cheaply overseas when coupled with a
need to operate independently leads to a dichotomy. The
most obvious way o-f ensuring an independent maintenance
capability is to design and manufacture the prime equipment
onesel-f. A move away from this position necessitates a
trade-o-ff between lower system acquisition costs and a high-
er risk of loss o-f independence. The previous chapter
discussed acquisition issues. The purpose o-f this chapter
is to raise issues involved in minimising the risks inherent
in operating systems purchased overseas and then to identity
the likely cost sources o-f so doing. Costs established in
this manner should be set against the assessed savings o-f
purchasing the prime equipment overseas be-fore deciding the
most cost—effective course of action to follow.
The maintenance costs of a weapons system a.re a signif-
icant part of its total through life costs. They are prob-
ably second only to manpower costs when all costs are
reduced to their net present value. It may well be that a
desire to minimise maintenance costs will affect the source
of the system chosen, even to the extent that the lowest
cost suitable prime equipment may not have the lowest over-
all cost of ownership. An example of this is provided by
Australia which operates Leopard tanks and 42 metre patrol
boats. Both are equipped with MTU diesel engines. The
Australian investment in MTU engine maintenance -Facilities
is considerable. The next major investment in high speed
diesel engines will be -for a new class of submarines. While
there are other diesel engine manu-f acturers whose products
are priced competitively with MTU, the cost o-f providing
-facilities -for maintaining additional MTU engines is likely
to be considerably less than providing the necessary -facili-
ties ior any other make o-f engine.
B. IN-COUNTRY MAINTENANCE
Any new weapons system added to the inventory will
require maintenance procedures which are similar to others
already carried out -for existing equipments. It will most
likely also require new procedures using technologies that
are new to the De-fence Force. It is important to identify
these new procedures and evaluate whether they can be car-
ried out successfully by using the nation's current indus-
trial base. Where new industry base requirements are
identified the next stage is to look at the most cost-
effective way of satisfying them, bearing in mind national
economic and defence philosophies.
First, an evaluation should be made of the integrity of
the overseas prime source. Where it is decided that this
source does not meet national requirements with regard to
this point, an alternative method of maintaining the system
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in operational condition needs to be established. There ar&
several available options, such as the stockpiling o-F parts
and sub-assemblies, purchase of the necessary technologies,
establishment of a more secure -foreign maintenance source or




Some stockpiling of spare parts and sub-assemblies
will be required, whatever the relationship between supplier
and buyer, in order to have inventory readily available to
the user. Quantities of needed spares should be optimised
using economic order quantity (EOQ) models, which trade off
ordering costs and holding costs to achieve minimum overall
inventory costs. A good coverage of EOQ models is provided
by Rose who gives guidance on cost estimation under condi-
tions of both stable and unstable demand for various levels
of service. CRef . 7: Ch. 63 Any additional quantities deemed
necessary for war reserves should be estimated by first
establishing the maximum credible time period for which
supplies might be disrupted and then estimating the numbers
of spares that would be required to cover that period. The
holding costs of such an inventory can then be established
quantitatively.
2. Technology Transfer
It may be possible, at the time of purchasing the
prime equipment, to arrange for the transfer of any desired
technologies. Such transfers may be arranged with few
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restrictions on their use or they may be made under strict
license conditions which preclude their use in other appli-
cations. I-f the -former is the case, then the true costs of
trans-fer can be shared among all likely users, however, in
the latter case all the transfer costs have to be borne by
the project. Any technology transfer arrangements are prob-
ably best negotiated concurrently with the contract for the
prime equipment as this is the time when the supplier is
most likely to be amenable to entering into such agreements,
due to his desire to sell the prime equipment. The advan-
tage of technology transfer over stockpiling is that holding
costs, which can be considerable, are minimised. The disad-
vantage is that the technology has to be maintained at some
minimum level which will allow it to be utilised when re-
quired. The costs associated with this approach are depen-
dent on the assessed warning time available to bring the
technology to the required level of readiness.
3. Other Foreign Sources
Using a third country to satisfy maintenance needs
is particularly appealing to a country which has close ties,
and probably land borders, with a country other than the one
from which it is purchasing the prime equipment. Good
examples of this strategy are provided by the European
countries which provide mutual support for F-16 and Jaguar
aircraft maintenance. Mutual support, providing it can be
relied upon, leads to economies of scale savings.
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4. internal Development of a Maintenance Capability
This option allows a high level of self —sufficiency
,
however it is likely to involve high relative costs and
higher risks. The recipient country develops its own main-
tenance philosophies and methods based on its experience
with the equipment, supplemented by whatever intelligence it
can glean from other sources. This approach is used out of
necessity by such countries as Israel and South Africa and
from time to time by others as they perceive other mainten-
ance methods which better suit their needs. Such variations
are often spawned by user modifications to equipments to
satisfy national interests. An example of this is provided
by Australia which has modified its F— 111A aircraft weapon
delivery systems to release domestically produced convent-
ional bombs. The risks associated with a go-it-alone'
policy a.re twofold in that significant problems may be
missed due to the relatively small samples experienced; and
in that a move away from the initial configuration may lead
to costly problems if further modifications a.re envisaged.
The costs and benefits of instituting philosophies
which rely on the independent development of a maintenance
capability are difficult to predict as the problems likely
to be encountered are, by their nature, unstructured.
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C. PERFORMANCE LEVELS
As the required levels o-f performance of a system in-
crease, then so do the likely costs. Minimum levels o-f
acceptable performance need to be established early in the
process as they will have a direct bearing on which maint-
enance philosophy is likely to have the largest ratio o-f
benefits to costs. Such an approach may even eliminate some
options altogether. The system performance level require-
ments of the supplier country should be compared with the
aspirations of the buyer country and any variations noted
and costed. Significant savings can be achieved by chall-
enging performance levels which are set unnecessarily high
by operational staffs.
1 . Operational Availability
As operational availability requirements increase,
then so does the necessity for timely repair and maintenan-
ce. The latter is achei ved by higher investment in mainte-
nance support in the form of both equipment and personnel.
'Repair by replacement' philosophies, with their high inven-
tory investment in major sub-assemblies, progressively
replace the lower cost repair in place' philosophies as
availability requirements become more stringent. Higher
levels of availability also require additional personnel.
The ultimate example of this is the nuclear ballistic
submarine which needs two complete crews and significant
4::
numbers of highly skilled support personnel in order to
achieve required availabilities of 95% or more.
2. System Performance Levels
The level o-f performance required of an individual
system directly impacts on its maintenance cost. The higher
the level o-f required performance and the smaller the toler-
ance of acceptable performance about that standard, the
higher the maintenance costs become because corrective main-
tenance is required each time that system performance falls
outside specifications. It is normal practice for weapons
systems suppliers to quote ideal performance standards.
Prospective buyers should assess the actual standards that
are being used by the supplier nation's defence force to
operate their systems and then set maintenance policies
accordingly.
3. Early Establishment of Performance Levels
The earlier in the life of a project that performa-
nce levels are set, the better will be the information on
which to base project decisions. Early decisions on main-
tenance requirements can lead to lower costs by allowing the
buyer country to purchase investment spares (repairable
items) at the same time as orders ^re placed for the items
that will be needed to produce the prime equipment. This
should ensure identicality of equipments and also lead to
some savings due to economies of scale. The US General
Accounting Office has estimated that such purchases should
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save up to 20X o-f the cost o-f spares CRe-f . 8: p 16D . Early
decisions on operational performance requirements will as-
sist with decisions concerning the level (depot, interme-
diate or operational) at which equipments will be repaired,
and hence where -facilities will be located. In general, the
more work that can be undertaken at the depot level, the
lower the cost o-f establishing the necessary -facilities, due
to the smaller numbers required.
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VI- COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS
This chapter relies heavily on unpublished work by Steve
Cylke o-f the Economic Analysis Branch (OP-162) o-f the
United States Department o-f the Navy, Deputy Chie-f o-f Naval
Operations (Manpower, Personnel and Training). CRef.93
Previous chapters raised and discussed some o-f the costs
and bene-fits that might be associated with purchasing wea-
pons systems overseas or designing and manufacturing them
using domestic resources. The objective o-f this chapter is
to present a method o-f producing a valid analysis o-f the
pros and cons -for taking various courses of action. The
purpose of this analysis is to materially assist the
decision-maker in coming to an informed decision on the
acquisition method to be used for a particular project. It
is recognised that the project manager is unlikely to be a
specialist in economic analysis and, furthermore, that his
time and knowledge Are too valuable to expect him to master
the detail required to complete a comprehensive analysis
himself. Rather, he needs to have an understanding of three
things; the basics of the analysis; where he interfaces with
the professional analyst; and what information he needs to
gather and input to the process.
A cost/benefit analysis is one method of ordering alter-
native courses of action. It assigns a net present value to
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each alternative. The course which has the highest net
present value should be the one most deserving o-f detailed
consideration for implementation. A good cost/benef 1 1 anal-
ysis leaves an auditable trail leading to how the decision
was made. This is particularly important in the public
sector where the project manager is charged, above all else,
with giving the taxpayer the best value -for money. It is
easy to recognise the benefits o-f 'state o-f the art' tech-
nologies and -forget their costs because the benefits accrue
to the individual's organisation while the costs are borne
elsewhere, ie. by the taxpayer. A cost/ benefit analysis
weighs the benefits against the costs and gives a net pre-
sent value for each course of action being considered.
The analysis consists of four stages:
1. Choose feasible alternative courses of action and
define the useful life of the system;
2. Identify and guantify the costs and benefits of each
course outlined in 1 above;
3. Derive the net present value of each alternative; and
4. Conduct a sensitivity analysis of each net present
value computation.
A. CHOICE OF ALTERNATIVES
The previous chapter went some way towards discussing
the alternatives for procuring a weapons system. Clearly
there are numerous ways of accomplishing the acguisition,
ranging from conducting the complete project in—country to
purchasing the whole system package off the shelf overseas.
Government initiated constraints, such as the time scale
within which the system must be operational, or mandated
ways o-f achieving some o-f the phases o-f the project, may
make some courses o-f action not -feasible. The analysis then
requires a trade—o-f-f between the number of feasible alter-
native ways to be analysed and the resources available to
complete it. The project manager should choose the most
likely set of alternatives, taking care not to prejudge some
alternatives from the analysis because the benefits appear
to be small. The costs may be even smaller.
The analysis should be a total length—of —ownership anal-
ysis and therefore the operational life of the weapons
system needs to be established. The expected life of a
particular system may well have been directed by higher
authority as part of the project documentation. The further
one looks ahead in a project, the less accurate the assum-
ptions made become, however, where significant differences
can be detected in the operating and maintenance costs of
the different alternatives, the whole—of -1 if e approach be-
comes an essential element of the analysis.
B. MEASUREMENT OF COSTS AND BENEFITS
The costs and benefits of each alternative should be
identified and then measured. The project manager is likely
to be the expert at identification but will most probably
need help with measurement. It is important to note the
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necessity o-f looking at the costs and bene-fits that will
accrue to the nation rather than those that will accrue to
the defence community. It is the nation that pays the costs
and derives the bene-fits. A good analysis, which clearly
identifies the national issues involved, is likely to be o-f
assistance in obtaining the -funding required to complete the
approved course o-f action.
Where costs and bene-fits can be quantified they should
be. Where they are identified but cannot be measured with
any degree of accuracy, then the decision process falls back
on subjective judgement. It is possible, however, to mini-
mise the requirements for subjectivity. Even a checklist of
benefits, set against quantified costs, can assist the dec-
ision maker by allowing him to ask the the question "If
alternative A costs $n less than alternative B, are the
additional benefits provided by B worth at least $n?". Any
additional information on the benefits to be expected can
only assist the decision-maker.
One particular problem facing the defence decision—maker
is that defence is rarely sold on the open market. It is
therefore difficult to compute, or even impute, a dollar
value for the benefits. In the international versus domes-
tic acquisition field, however, this problem can be elimi-
nated by making the outputs of each alternative course of
action equal, ie. the amount of defence provided by each
alternative is made to be the same. It is preferable that
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only the marginal costs and bene-fits o-f each alternative be
considered. Where it is not possible to separate out the
marginal costs and bene-fits, then a strenuous e-f-Fort should
be made to include all costs, so that those costs and bene-
fits which are common to all options will cancel themselves
out in the -final analysis.
Where dollar values cannot be assigned to costs and
bene-fits, the next best approach is to devise some system
which assigns a pre-ference value to the alternatives pro-
posed. The alternatives can then be rank-ordered so that
there is some degree of quantification. Where this approach
is taken, it is necessary to document the assumptions made
and the procedures used. The decision—maker can then assign
his .pa own confidence levels to the analysis. Any struc-
tured effort to rank the alternatives is better than none.
C. CALCULATION OF NET PRESENT VALUE
All costs and benefits should be calculated at present
value, even though it is known that they will be applied at
some time in the future. The reason for this is that it is
difficult enough to predict the rate of inflation let alone
how a particular project will perform relative to that rate.
This is particularly true in the international arena where
different countries have different inflation rates. The
best that can be assumed is that monetary exchange rates
will themselves vary to equalise such differences. The rate
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o-f inflation will affect all costs and benefits to the same
extent and is therefore not a marginal cost in a cost/
benefit analysis.
This having been said, it is a generally accepted fact
that the present value of a dollar declines the further into
the future it will be received or paid. This is the real
rate of interest, or the time value of money. Most govern-
ments set a discount rate which is to be applied, by all
their agencies, to future streams of benefits and costs.
That is, they decide what is the value to them now of a
dollar to be spent or received in one year's time. If, for
instance, the discount rate is set at 107. per annum, the
government is saying that a dollar paid or received now is
worth the same as one dollar and ten cents to be paid or
received in one year's time.
In order to carry out a net present value (NPV) calcu-
lation, the future stream of costs and benefits for a part-
icular course of action should be established on a time-line
and then each cost and benefit should be discounted to the
present. All costs, at present value, should be totalled
and then subtracted from the totalled present value of the
benefits. The resulting figure is the net present value of
the alternative. Alternatives can then be rank—ordered , the
one with the highest NPV being the most favoured candidate
for implementation. There are numerous canned computer
programs which will calculate the net present value
providing the stream o-f cash flows and the discount rate are
entered.
Where projects are not dollar valued, a benefit to cost
ratio (BCR) can be established where the BCR is the net
present value o-f the benefits, in units, divided by the net
present value of the costs. Where a mixture of dollar
values and weighted values is used, the two should be calcu-
lated separately and then presented to the decision-maker
with a documented assessment of the effect that the BCR
should have on the computed NPV.
D. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
The prediction of future events, such as cash flows,
involves uncertainty. This is particularly true in such
areas as applying a value to possible alternative uses for
scarce resources, or estimating the retraining costs of
displaced labour. The results of any cost /benefit analysis
depend on the assumptions made about future cash flow behav-
iours. It is therefore important to have a feel for the
likely accuracy of the computation made. A common method of
doing this is to identify those factors which have the
biggest effect on the calculation, then vary them over a
reasonable range of values and observe their effect on the
NPV analysis. This should give a good idea of the likely
accuracy of the NPV calculation.
The analysis can go -further and assign probabilities
that various cash flows will occur should a particular
alternative be implemented. The sum of the probabilities
assigned to the envisaged cash -flows must add to one -for
each alternative course o-f action studied. I-f the NPV o-f
each and -flow scenario for a particular alternative is then
multiplied by the assessed probability o-f that scenario
occuring, the sum o-f the NPV's -for the scenarios so treated,
will give an expected net present value -for that alterna-
tive. This should give a better estimate o-f the likely
outcomes -for each possible course o-f action than does the
raw net present value calculation. The higher acc:ura.(zy o-f
this method has to be traded o-f-f against the additional work
it creates. This level o-f analysis is probably beyond that
which the project manager should attempt using his own
resources. It is incumbent on him to identi-fy whether such
an analysis is needed, and, if so, who should best perform
it. It may well be that a funded study by a specialised
economic analysis organisation is the most cost-effective
approach.
An example of a cost /benefit analysis by Cylke, Mairs,
Piatt and Waites of OP-162 is attached as Appendix A.
CRef.9U This analysis is not from the field of make or
buy', but does serve to illustrate the general methodology to
be followed.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The question of whether to make or to buy a major wea-
pons system is one o-f some national importance as it can
impact directly on several areas that affect a nation's
well-being. The decision on which way to proceed involves a
trade-off between numerous factors, which can vary from ones
which are easily quantified through to ones which might not
even be recognised.
The process leading to a decision might seem to be
unstructured and subjective at first sight, but, with some
effort, the analysis of the problem can be broken down into
its component parts and a form of structure introduced. It
is beyond the resources of the project manager to conduct
this analysis on his own. He must be aware of what he can
do best and what he should pass to others. His overriding
duty is to try to obtain the best value for the taxpayers
money. It is unlikely that the project manager will be the
final decision—maker and so his duty will normally be to
present, to higher authority, as many of the salient factors
as he can in a well documented analysis of the alternatives
avai 1 able.
He should consider not only the initial investment phase
of his project but also the through—life operating and
support costs which might accrue from each contemplated
course o-F action. He must look beyond the con-fines of his
own organisation and estimate the costs and benefits as they
affect the taxpayer.
While reviewing the costs and benefits, it is likely
that the project manager will -find that neither total build
nor total buy is the cheapest real cost option. The
strength o-f a structured approach to the problem is that it
should become clear which parts o-f the project should be
undertaken using domestic resources and which should be
undertaken elsewhere. Even the production o-f a list o-f
projects which could be undertaken domestically, ranked -from
most cost effective to least cost effective, would be help-
ful to the decision-maker who is most probably looking for
the max i mum reasonable domestic involvement in the project.
Where the deci si on—maker opts to produce at home things
which appear to be uneconomic, he is applying a value to
such unguantif i able factors as the national interest and
national security.
The purpose of this paper was to set down a methodology
and discuss some of the issues involved in reaching a make
or buy decision. Hopefully it has demonstrated that a
project manager can, with suitable help, produce a reasoned,
sustainable argument, for presentation to the decision-
maker, showing which of the identified alternatives he be-
lieves to be the one to follow. At best his recommendations
will be accepted, at worst he can assume that, where his
recommendations were not accepted, he has been o-f some
assistance to the decision-maker by laying out the factors
involved in proceeding in particular directions.
The decision to make or to buy is one which may have an
effect lasting -For -forty years, the average li-fecycle o-f a
major weapons project -from approval to extinction. This
paper attempted a light treatment o-f the topic and is in-
tended to be nothing more than a -framework on which the
individual project manager can build his own analysis.
There ^re many detailed reference works which the project
manager can, and should, consult in order to achieve the
best possible analysis within the many constraints with
which he is presented.
APPENDIX A
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS EXAMPLE
Written by : Steve Cylke, Lee S.Mairs, U.W.Piatt and Wendell
Waites. CRe-f . 9: Appendix D
The -following is a sample economic analysis tor an ADP
system acquisition. This example is not intended to dupli-
cate all the data collection, calculations and written
material which should accompany a proper analysis — thus,
these results should not be used -for making a policy deci-
sion. Rather, the primary objective is to illustrate the
general process o-f cost/bene-fit analysis and the rationale
behind it. Hope-fully, the discussion and comments which
accompany this analysis will clarity some o-f the more diffi-
cult concepts outlined in the preceding guide.
A. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The sample cost/bene-fit analysis chosen -for this guide
is the provision o-f ADP assistance to the Enlisted Community-
Managers (ECMs) in 0P-132C. The ECMs manage the Navy's
entire enlisted -force, with each o-f the eleven ECMs respon-
sible -for several enlisted ratings. The ECM ' s work consists
mainly o-f generating a large volume o-f correspondence, con-
ducting data analyses, and presenting the results o-f these
analyses in summary or graphical -form.
The ECM section currently has no computer equipment.
Although there is an QF-132 computer system, this system is
utilized largely by the Q-f-ficer Community Managers (OCMs) .
Also, the OP- 132 computer does not have a letter-quality
printer, which limits its value -for producing correspond-
ence- Currently, all data analyses by the ECMs are typed by
•five yeomen (YNs) on ordinary typewriters, not word proces-
sing equipment. About 40 percent o-f all correspondence
typed by the TNs is for the ECMs and this correspondence
normally requires a number o-f ti me—consumi ng revisions in-
cluding retyping by the YNs, reviewing by the ECMs, -further
retyping, etc. In addition to typing, the YNs provide
administrative support such as answering phones, maintaining
o-ffice supplies, copying, -filing and other administrative
-functions -for the entire branch. There-fore, although this
analysis concentrates on the YN time saved on typing corres-
pondence, there are other areas (specifically, filing and
copying) which would also benefit from automation.
It is anticipated that automation of the section would
result in time savings for YNs typing correspondence, as
well as for ECMs in analyzing data and producing graphs. As
we discuss below, this time savings should imply either a
shifting of YN and ECM work into other areas or, preferably,
to manpower or billet reductions. Further, although there
is no evidence of unaccomplished (untyped or incomplete)
work, there is evidence that the quality of current work and
the quantity o-f potential work would be increased under a
more automated system.
B. ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED
We consider -four alternatives in this cost/bene-f 1
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analysis:
1. A hi ghl y—automated alternative with individual micro-
computers -for each ECM.
2. A highly-automated alternative with two large micro-
computers with a terminal -for each ECM.
3. An "intermediate" option which more intensively uses
the OP— 132 computer by adding a letter quality printer.
4. The current non-automated system (staus-quo)
.
The highly—automated alternatives have the -following
capabilities: text typing and editing (word processing)
with spelling error checks; data -filing, analysis and ret-
rieval; programming in a high-level language (BASIC, FOR-
TRAN, PL1 , etc.); and graphics -for the presentation o-f data
and analyses. The hardware would consist o-f either a large
micro—computer with a terminal -for each ECM or a smaller
micro—computer system -for each ECM. Printing would be hand-
led by a single dot-matrix printer -for preliminary drafts
and a letter-quality printer -for final copies.
With the highly-automated alternatives, the ECMs them-
selves would assume much o-f the initial typing work. The
YNs ' role would be to place correspondence in proper Navy
-format and to type corrections to correspondence as reques-
ted. The hi ghl y—automated alternatives would provide one
additional terminal or one portable computer to the YNs -for
this reason. Since the initial draft typing -function would
be transferred from YNs to ECMs, the total number of YNs can
educed.
The intermediate solution involves increased use of the
existing OP-132 system by adding a letter
—
quality printer.
The OP- 132 system already has word processing, spelling
error check, and programming (BASIC language) capabilities.
There is one terminal currently available to OP-132. (An-
other terminal is connected to the system but it is used by
OP— 134 personnel.) The addition of a letter—qual ity printer
would reduce the time required to produce correspondence.
Since only one terminal would be available under this alter-
native, the word processing capability would be used mostly
by the YNs, and it is not anticipated that a staff reduction
would be possible. As we discuss below, this alternative
would produce some (reduced amounts of) time savings in
typing correspondence as well as improved quality and quan-
tity of EC!i output.
The final alternative is the status quo. The status quo
is a default option which is chosen only if the other alter-
natives arB not economically justified. As is discussed in
the text, this is a very common means of including the
status quo in the cost /benefit comparison. When used as a
default alternative, it is also implicitly assumed that the
status quo is itself economically justified. Thus, we only
need to consider the marginal (or additional) costs and
benefits o-F the proposed alternatives relative to the status
quo. The cost savings -from replacing the status quo with an
alternative are considered as benefits o-F adopting that
alternative.
The decision rule is that if the net present value o-f
additional benefits (including cost savings) exceeds the net
present costs, that alternative is preferred to the status
quo. If all the alternatives have a positive net present
value, then the alternative with the highest net present
value is the most preferred. On the other hand, if costs
exceed benefits (and cost savings) for all the alternatives,
the status quo is preferred.
C. BENEFIT ANALYSIS
The followng are the primary benefits or cost savings
expected from the new ADP system alternatives:
1. Reduction in time required to produce correspondence.
2. Reduction in time required to produce analyses of data
and graphs.
3. Improved quality of the final product - ie., reduced
errors associated with hand tabulation of data and editing
of correspondence; improved quality of graphs.
4. Improved cataloging and filing of information - easier
to train and update new personnel; easier to retrieve and
transfer information between ECMs and others with similar
systems.
5. Improved access to force projection models and data,
many of which are currently stored and run on similar
systems.
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6. Increased ECM output due to reduced response time to
the many time—sensitive items which would not be completed
or even attempted under the current system.
The highly-automated system is expected to provide
benefits (cost-savings) in all the above categories. The
intermediate solution is expected to provide benefits in
categories 1,3, and 6, since only increased word-processing
capabilities a.re included in the system.
The next issue is how these bene-fits should be quanti-
fied. The text presents several possible approaches to
measuring benefits. As we mention above, since the status
quo is assumed to be economically justified, we only need to
measure the changes in costs and benefits from that
basel ine.
1
. Benefits from Highly-Automated Systems
The highly automated alternatives produce measurable
benefits and resource savings in three specific areas.
a. The Reduction in Time Required for Current
Levels of Correspondence
The transfer of initial typing from the YNs to
the ECMs will result in YN time savings for typing corres-
pondence. On the other hand, we anticipate no net increased
time required for the ECMs since correspondence can normally
be composed at the typewriter at least as easily as by long-
hand. In fact, the quicker turn—around time for corrections
and revisions will more than offset any additional ECM time
which might be required for initial typing of the
correspondence. In order to provide a conservative estimate
o-f potential savings, however, it will be assumed that the
ECMs ' time requirements for current levels o-f correspondence
a.r& the same with or without the ADP system. Thus, the cost
savings -from typing o-f correspondence are based on the
savings of YNs ' time only.
b. The Reduction in Time Required to Produce Cur-
rent Graphics
The benefits for reduction in graphics time is
based on the time savings expected with the current amount
of required graphics material prepared by the ECMs. The
normal graphics requirements for the ECMs is 6 graphs for
each of the 99 ratings per quarter. It is estimated that
these graphs take about an hour each to prepare. The time
to produce these graphs with the ADP system is expected to
be about ten minutes for each.
c. Increase in Both the Quantity and Quality of ECM
Output
To measure the benefits of improved ECM output
we conducte the following experiment: By surveying ECMs and
observing other organizations which have similar systems, we
estimated the current ECM time required to produce the same
quantity and quality expected under the highly-automated
systems. In economic terms, this extra potential output
(estimated, conservatively, at 1QV. of current ECM time) is
an "opportunity cost" of not having an automated system.
However, since this quality and quantity is not currently
being produced, we cannot assume that all this time would
have full benefit (ie. , would be demanded) by the Navy. As
a rough approximation, there-fore, we took halt the addition-
al ECM time C5/C) as the added output value resulting -from
the highly automated systems. (Although the assumptions
used here may appear somewhat arbitrary, we "test" their
impact on the final decision by conducting a sensitivity
analysis. As we stress in the guide, it is important to
quantify wherever possible.)
2. Benefits from the Intermediate Option
The measurable benefits from the intermediate option
include two of the three benefits from the highly—automated
alternatives — reduced correspondence time and increased
quantity and quality of ECM output. (No graphics capability
is provided.) The size of these benefits will be signifi-
cantly smaller, however, since all eleven ECMs and (YNs)
would share one terminal with the OCMs. To estimate bene-
fits in this situation, we start with the same values as
under the hi ghl y—automated alternatives. We then reduce
these benefits by 90X since there is only one, rather than
ten, terminals.
However, even this benefit estimate may be over-
stated since the one terminal will be shared with the OCMs
and queues may delay or deter use of the terminal. To
capture this effect, we observe that a normal terminal is
idle about 5B7. of the time - this is currently the case with
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the OP- 132 terminal. (Thus, if ECM and QuM demand tor that
terminal could be perfectly coordinated, benefits from this
alternative would be exactly 107. of the highly automated
benefits.) Based on previous OP-01 experience, we estimate
that waiting time reduces effective availibility of the
terminal to about 60X of its normal (undelayed) usage. „ This
implies a net benefit from the third alternative which is
roughly 67. (or .6 x 10*/.) of the benefit value of the other
highly-automated alternatives. This 67. factor is used to
calculate the benefits of reduced typing time and increased
ECM output resulting from the third alternative. (Again,
one may object to these figures as somewhat arbitrary, yet
sensitivity analysis will show the impact of the assumptions
on the final result. If the net present values of the
alternatives are close, then further "evidence" may be re-
quired before making a decision.)
3. Summary of Benefits
Estimates of the benefit values for each alternative
Are summarized in Table I below. The base year for opera-
tion of the system is assumed to be 1985, with a system life
of 5 years. Table I shows annual benefits of roughly
£115,000 for the highly-automated systems and £3 , 600 for the
intermediate option. The present value of benefits using a
10'/. discount rate is $436,000 for Alternatives 1 and 2, and
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Notes to Table I
(1) This is the total annual ECM hours. it assumes an
average o-f 21 working days per month, a 40 hour workweek,
and a 207. average absentee rate due to leave, etc.
(2) The total annual typing requirements a.re based upon the
current YN typing load and assumes 10 minutes to type each
page.
(3) We estimate that the total YN typing effort under the
highly—automated system would be approximately 107. of the
current amount. This estimate was obtained through
interviews with ECMs and YNs, and observation of automation
changes in similar Navy organizations.
(4) The average annual cost for an ECM is based upon the
weighted average of the billet cost for eight Q-5s, one 0—4,
one 0-3, and one E—9.
(5) The amount of time spent on graphics under the highly-
automated systems assumes a reduction in time from 1 hour to
10 minutes per graph. This information was obtained through
interviews with ECMs, observation of current graphics
production, and knowledge of the comparative advantages of
automated graphics.
(6) The difference between this figure and the current ECM
hours reflects the additional ECM time required (under the
current system) to produce the same quality and quantity of
output which could be attained under a highly-automated
system. For the current estimate we used a 10/i difference
in output quality and quantity, which we translate to roug-
hly a 57 difference in required hours. This is a very
conservative estimate based upon interviews with ECMs, ob-
servation of the ECM work process, and comparison with
similar organizations which have converted from manual to
automated processing.
(7) The annual cost for a YN is based upon weighted average
billet cost for one E—7, one E—5, and two E-4s.
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A key assumption underlying the estimates in Table I is
that the time—savings benefits -for correspondence and graph-
ics are valued at the billet cost o-f the personnel (YNs and
ECMs) involved. This implies one o-f two situations resul-
ting -from automation. In the -first case, automation re-
leases personnel to perform other work which has a value to
the Navy equal to their billet cost. In the second (prefer-
red) case, automation allows the Navy to reduce the total
manpower (YNs) required to do the work. In either case, the
cost savings is appropriately valued at the billet cost of
ECMs' or YNs' time.
D. COST ANALYSIS
Estimated costs for the ADP alternatives were obtained
from discussions with local vendors of computer equipment.
These include costs for acquisition, operation and mainten-
ance, software, disk storage, and training. Training costs
include fee to the vendors and the billet costs for the Navy
personnel being trained. Because of the 2—3 year rotation
period of the ECMs, billet training costs Bre expended three
times during the five—year ADP system life—cycle.
For the individual portable computer system, costs a.re
based on Kaypro II systems which have 64K of random access
memory (RAM) each. The large computer system considered
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The costs for the intermediate solution include only the
initial cost of a letter quality printer and reduced mainte-
nance (10V.) and training costs (about 15/i) over the lite-
cycle. (Opportunity costs o-f training ECMs are reduced, but
the total costs o-f contractor
—
provided training remain the
same.
)
The costs -for the ADP system -for each year o-f the life—
cycle are shown in Table II. As in benefit computation,
costs are converted to a present value basis by discounting
costs occurring in future years (at I0/C) . The present value
of costs for the individual portable computer is $35,000.
(This includes the deduction of salvage value at the end of
the project life.) The present value of costs for the large
computer system is $55,000 while the net present cost of the
intermediate option is only about $4,700.
E. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
To determine the most preferred alternative, we now
simply take the difference between the net present value of
benefits and costs for each option. Under the baseline
assumptions the net present value for the two highly-
automated options (Alternatives 1 and 2) are $401,000 and
$381,000 respectively. The net present value of the inter-
mediate option (Alternative 3) is only $8,900. Since all
three options have positive net present values, they are all
preferred to the status quo. The individual computer option
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(Alternative 1) is the most preferred o-F the three, while
the net present value o-f Alternative 3 is insignificant in
comparison to the other two.
Sensitivity analysis tests the "strength" of these con-
clusions under alternative assumptions about the future
costs and benefits involved. Since future benefits (and
cost savings) ^re based upon more tenuous assumptions than
costs, we should vary benefits proportionately more than
costs. To test the sensitivity of our results, we ask the
question: would we still prefer an automated alternative if
benefits were 50X lower and/or costs were 10X higher?
Under these assumptions the net present value of
benefits from Alternatives 1 and 2 would be reduced to
$218, 000 and net present costs would increase to $39,000 and
$61,000 respectively. Thus, even with large reductions in
benefits and significant increases in costs, both highly-
automated alternatives have large, positive net present
values and remain cost—effective relative to the status quo.
In fact, given the baseline cost estimates for Alternatives
1 and 2, the benefits from these options would have to be
reduced by 92X and 377. respectively, before the status quo
would become the preferred alternative.
Finally, despite the fact that the two highly—automated
alternatives show significant positive net present values,
their ultimate desirability hinges on whether or not man-
power savings can be realized. If YN billets are not given
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up to buy the new systems (and ECMs ars not productive with
their newly available time) then the status quo remains the
most economic alternative. In -fact, the unwillingness (or
inability) o-f Navy managers to trade manpower -for e-f + iciency
may be the reason why many Navy organizations have not been
automated to date.
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